SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW

In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent New Jersey cases of interest to practitioners. In so doi'ng, we
hope to assist the legal community in keeping abreast of some of the
more interesting changes in significant areas of practice.
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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE-ESCAPE FROM INCARCERATION
AFTER ARREST AND INDICTMENT IS RELEVANT AND PROBATIVE

State v. Tomaras, 168
N.J. Super. 418, 403 A.2d 61 (Law Div. 1979).
EVIDENCE OF CONSCIOUSNESS OF GUILT,

On December 15, 1975, Robert Cooper was shot and killed. A
few days later, defendant, Tomaras, and two other persons were arrested in connection with the incident. Defendant was subsequently
indicted for first degree murder and incarcerated. On Christmas day
he escaped, was later discovered and returned to trial. 168 N.J.
Super. at 420, 403 A.2d at 62.
The issue presented to Judge Madden by these facts was
whether the escape constituted flight and should be admitted into
evidence. New Jersey has long recognized flight as relevant and
probative evidence but generally, the question arises in the context of
flight from the scene of the crime, not escape from jail after arrest.
However, Judge Madden read the definition of flight in BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 768 (4th ed. 1951) as being broad enough to encompass
an escape.
Admitting this evidence of flight, though, is not without criticism, and in Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896) the United
States Supreme Court remarked that innocent men often flee the
scene of the crime to avoid involvement and mistaken apprehension.
Judge Madden felt these reasons did not apply to an escape from jail,
and quoted People v. Terry, 2 Cal. 3d 362, 466 P.2d 961, 85 Cal.
Rptr. 409, cert. denied, 406 U.S. 912 (1972), for the proposition that
only a guilty man would attempt an escape while an innocent man
would remain in order to clear his name. The New Jersey cases
further supported the court's position. State v. Young, 97 N.J.L. 501,
117 A. 713 (Ct. Err. & App. 1922), allowed evidence of defendant's
attempt to procure escape tools, and State v. Petrolia, 45 N.J.
Super., 230, 132 A.2d 311 (App. Div. 1957), certif. denied, 25 N.J.
43, 134 A.2d 539 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 942 (1958), allowed
evidence of defendant jumping bail as proof of consciousness of guilt.
The holding in this case significantly broadens the admissibility
of flight evidence to almost any voluntary disappearance between the
crime and the trial. However, Judge Madden's contention that inferences drawn from an escape rest on "firmer ground" than inferences
of guilt drawn from fleeing the scene of the crime may not be fully
justified. 168 N.J. Super. at 421, 403 A.2d at 63. The criticism that
innocent parties will flee due to a fear of mistaken apprehension may
be even more justified when the victim has been mistakenly ap-
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prehended. The type of innocent person who will flee the scene of a
crime is often one who has experienced trouble in the past. If this
person is inadvertently arrested, he may feel that his fate has been
sealed before trial, and resort to escape. Also, people who are confined may develop overwhelming desires to be free unrelated to guilt
or innocence. Therefore evidence of this nature should be handled
with great care by trial judges.
T.F.Q.
ADMISSIBILITY
TRANSCRIPT

OF EVIDENCE-CRoss
OBTAINED

FROM

EXAMINATION-

UNAVAILABLE

PRELIMINARY HEARING NOT ADMISSIBLE

WITNESS

IN

EVIDENCE AT CRIMI-

State v. Moody, 169 N.J. Super. 177, 404 A.2d 370
(Law Div. 1978).

NAL TRIAL,

The issue presented in this case concerned the construction of
N.J.R. EVID. 63(3)(b), and whether it barred the recitation of a transcript to the jury obtained in a preliminary hearing from a witness
who at the time of the trial was unavailable. This rule provides, in
part, that a transcript of previous testimony be admitted if the declarant gave it "as a witness in a former trial of a criminal proceeding."
In the trial hearing to determine if defendant's objection to the
evidence should be sustained, the State relied on State v. Ewing, 154
N.J. Super. 473, 381 A.2d 838 (Law Div. 1977), a decision involving
facts similar to those in Moody, where the court admitted a transcript
into evidence. The Ewing court held that the State could constitutionally utilize the transcript because two conditions had been met:
the witness was unavailable through no fault of the State and "the
absent witness had been adequately confronted and cross-examined at
the prior hearing." Id. at 478, 381 A.2d at 841. These requirements
were derived from California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 166 (1970),
which held that as long as they were met, defendant's rights under
the sixth amendment confrontation clause were not violated. Ewing
applied this decision to New Jersey law because the confrontation
clauses in both the Federal and New Jersey constitutions are identical.
In Moody, Judge Martino disagreed with the Ewing holding. 169
N.J. Super. at 178, 404 A.2d at 371. He acknowledged that Green
permitted this testimony, but distinguished it as clearly allowing "the
States . . . to afford even greater protection to a defendant." Id. at
178, 404 A.2d at 371. Moody first examined the origins of N.J.R.
EVID. 63(3)(b) which had been adopted almost verbatim from the
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New Jersey Supreme Court Committee Report on Evidence, including an explanatory passage specifically noting that the proposed rule
was intended to provide only for the admissibility of evidence given
at a prior trial. Id. at 179, 404 A.2d at 371-72. Judge Martino therefore concluded that due to the similarity between the actual and
proposed rules, it was the intent of the supreme court to adopt the
committee's comment and disallow the evidence. Moreover, he felt
that if this were not their intent, the supreme court would have
eliminated the words "former trial" making the meaning of the rule
unequivocal. Id. at 179-80, 404 A.2d at 372.
New Jersey now has two conflicting views on the admissibility of
a transcript as evidence in a criminal trial. The Moody court disagreed with Ewing based on its view of the New Jersey supreme
court's intent. However, the words "former trial of a criminal proceeding" remain troublesome because if the words "former trial" are
eliminated, the rule would clearly allow the evidence to be admitted.
Deleting the words "of a criminal proceeding," however, would
clearly call for the opposite result. It is left to our higher courts to
resolve this disparity.
T.F.Q.
ALIENS-ILLEGAL

ALIENS

ENJOY ACCESS TO STATE COURTS FOR

ENFORCEMENT OF AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE POLICIES FOUNDED

IN PRIVATE CONTRACT-Montoya v. Gateway Insurance Co.,

168 N.J. Super. 100, 401 A.2d 1102 (App. Div. 1979).
On November 6, 1971, Aurelio Montoya entered the United
States as a visitor and soon after secured employment. He was working for more than a year when he was seriously injured in an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, he was covered by an
automobile insurance policy issued by Gateway Insurance Company
(Gateway) which included personal injury protection (PIP). Gateway
and its successor, The New Jersey Property Liability Insurance
Guaranty Association, paid all of Montoya's medical bills and income
continuation benefits for almost a year. The payments ceased when
Montoya returned to his home in Colombia. Montoya then brought
suit for the benefits that he was denied. 168 N.J. Super. at 102-03,
401 A.2d at 1103.
At trial, the judge rejected the contentions that Montoya's status
as an illegal alien precluded any further recovery of benefits and effectively barred his access to the courts. Accordingly, the trial judge,
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granting summary judgment for Montoya, awarded him sums for
medical expenses, income continuation, interest and counsel fees. Id.
at 103, 401 A.2d at 1103.
On appeal, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, affirmed the holding that the plaintiff's status as an illegal alien
did not bar him from access to the courts. Id. at 108, 401 A.2d at
1106. The court found that Montoya's rights arose under a private
contract, and he was entitled to recover from the insurance company
for the personal injury sustained, including income continuation benefits. Id. at 108, 401 A.2d at 1106. In resolving the issue of accessibility to the courts, reliance was placed upon precedent from other
jurisdictions which allowed illegal aliens access to the courts to enforce contracts and secure redress for civil wrongs. Such decisions
were founded upon the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution, and provided that the stated rights were
guaranteed to all persons, regardless of citizenship. Additional support for this proposition was found in congressional legislation guaranteeing rights to persons without regard to their citizenship.
Evaluating the plaintiff's action, the court found it to be
grounded in private contract in that a premium was paid to Gateway
to assume the described policy risks. Absent was any contractual language conditioning recovery upon the legal status of the claimant's
presence within the United States. Accordingly, the court found that
the defendant's liability for medical expenses was not negated simply
because Montoya's presence in this country was not authorized by
law. Id. at 105, 401 A.2d at 1104.
Addressing the issue of income continuation benefits, the court
noted the applicability of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6A-4(b) (West 1976),
which provides for loss of income payments to an income producer in
the event of disability. Relevant statutory language required this income producer to be in an occupational status at the time of the
accident. Id. § 39:6A-2(d). In this regard, the court rejected the de-fendant's contention that the plaintiff was not within this category because his status as an illegal alien prevented him from maintaining
any legal occupational status. Although illegal aliens violate the law
by engaging in gainful employment, the court distinguished between
work which in itself is illegal, such as bookmaking, and work which is
unlawful simply because of the status of the person performing it. In
the opinion of the court, Montoya's "illegal presence and his disability
from engaging in gainful pursuits [could] not . . . be held to deprive
him of occupational status." 168 N.J. Super. at 107, 401 A.2d at 1105.
The decision in Montoya is significant in its reaffirmation of the
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capacity of illegal aliens to sue for personal injury and lost earnings
caused by the negligence of another. Emphasizing that its holding
was founded in the private contractual relationship of the parties involved, the Montoya court carefully distinguished its decision from
the public policy considerations regarding illegal aliens. The court refused to accept the contention that a person's status as an illegal alien
could be used to insulate an insurance company from contractual liability coverage freely and knowledgeably extended to the illegal alien.
A delicate balance was struck by the court, under which the rights of
illegal aliens are maintained while federal policy regarding such individuals remains intact.
L. M. F.
ANIMALS-ToRTS-DoG OWNER'S STRICT LIABILITY FOR ANIMAL's BEHAVIOR NOT APPLICABLE TO TEMPORARY KEEPER OF

DoG-Mascola v. Mascola, 168 N.J. Super. 122, 401 A.2d 1114
(App. Div. 1979).
Elizabeth Mascola, an infant of six years, by her guardian,
brought an action in strict liability against her parents for injuries
sustained from a dog bite. She had been bitten by a Doberman
pinscher tied in the backyard of her home while the dog was in the
temporary care of her parents. 168 N.J. Super. at 124, 401 A.2d at
1115.
The trial court denied the parents' motion for summary judgment, finding that the term "owner" included all who had a dog in
their keeping according to the provisions of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:1916 (West 1973). Plaintiff then moved before another judge, seeking
summary judgment in favor of the infant, and partial summary judgment was granted. The appellate division granted leave to appeal to
consider the issue of temporary custody. 168 N.J. Super. at 124, 401
A.2d at 1116.
In considering the applicable provisions of the New Jersey
statutes relative to rabies control, and dog bites N.J. STAT, ANN.
§§ 4:19-15.1 to -15.29 (West 1973) and N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 4:19-1 to
-9 (West 1973), the court determined that it was inappropriate to consider these statutes in pari materia. 168 N.J. Super. at 125, 401 A.2d
at 1116. Although many New Jersey courts, in interpreting the Rabies

Control Act, have found that the legislature intended the term
"owner" to apply to all who kept dogs, there was no similar
intent
under the dog bite statute. Tanga v. Tanga, 94 N.J. Super. 5, 14, 226
A.2d 723, 727 (App. Div. 1966). The court pointed out that the
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Rabies Control Act was enacted several years after the dog bite statute, which has no provision to include "keeper," and that the separate articles have never been incorporated into one act. 168 N.J.
Super. at 125-26, 401 A.2d at 1116.
In refusing to extend the meaning of owner to temporary keepers, the Mascola court looked to the common law respecting dog
bites as a more appropriate means of considering liability and legislative intent. Under common law, liability depended upon the owner
or keeper's knowledge of a dog's viciousness, and a keeper could recover for damages when prior knowledge of viciousness was proven.
Since a cause of action existed under common law when a keeper had
prior knowledge of a dog's viciousness, it was necessary for the plaintiff to establish this essential element. She failed to do this, and, as a
result, was barred from recovery. Id. at 126-28, 401 A.2d at 111718.
The Mascola decision intimates that the issue of ownership has
been carefully considered by both the judicial and legislative systems,
and further extension in meaning would be unnecessary. However,
while under statutory language, temporary keepers are not considered owners within the "dog bite" statute, they are considered owners within the Rabies Control Act, and may be considered owners
under common law if prior knowledge of viciousness can be proven.
Id. at 125, 127, 401 A.2d at 1116-17. This inconsistency in meaning
causes confusion in terminology, and allows events, such as the one
here, to go uncompensated. The condition of viciousness in an animal
seems analogous to a rabid condition sinee both may possibly be present in an animal without the keeper's prior knowledge. If liability is
imposed for keeping a rabid dog without having knowledge of the
condition, then it would seem consistent to impose liability for keeping a potentially vicious dog, even if prior knowledge of such viciousness cannot be proven. The New Jersey Legislature should consider
applying the broader definition provided under the Rabies Control
Act and uniformly impose strict liability to all keepers of dogs.
M.V.S.
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE-PEDESTRIAN SUFFERING BODILY
INJURIES WHEN PROPELLED AGAINST STATIONARY AUTOMOBILE
ENTITLED TO PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION BENEFITS AS

v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 166 N.J. Super. 239, 399 A.2d 675 (Law Div. 1979).
MEMBER OF INSURED'S FAMILY-Berg

On April 19, 1974, eight-year old Pamela Berg was struck by a
commercial truck while walking in the westbound lane of Route 24 in
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Madison. The impact propelled her against a stalled, stationary automobile in the eastbound lane driven by Mrs. Thelma Wilkerson. As
a result, Pamela sustained severe bodily injuries. There were no
proofs attributing any specific injury to contact with either vehicle.
Pamela's father, Edward, was the named insured on a standard
New Jersey family automobile policy issued by Ohio Casualty. As required by New Jersey's no-fault automobile statute, the policy contained basic personal injury protection benefits (PIP) including medical expense benefits for any family member injured in "an accident
involving an automobile." 166 N.J. Super at 241-42, 399 A.2d at 676.
Another provision of the policy, however, provided that an individual
who sustained injury as a pedestrian when struck by a truck was not
entitled to PIP benefits but was limited to residual medical payments
coverage up to $1000 for medical expenses. Ohio Casualty argued
that Pamela belonged in this category. Id. at 243, 399 A.2d at 677.
Pamela and her father, as plaintiffs, sought a declaratory judgment construing the terms of the insurance policy and declaring that
Ohio Casualty was obligated to pay Pamela's medical expenses. Ohio
Casualty sought dismissal of the complaints on the theory that this
infant pedestrian was not entitled to PIP coverage under the no-fault
law. Id. at 241-42, 399 A.2d at 676.
The trial court, Judge MacKenzie presiding, held that the
phrase, "an accident involving an automobile," must be understood to
mean incident to or having connection with, the use of an automobile. Since Pamela's contact with the Wilkerson car was a link in
the chain of events occasioning the injury, it was therefore an accident involving an automobile. Id. at 245, 399 A.2d at 678.
The court found that neither the no-fault law nor decisional authority suggested that the injuries must be caused exclusively by contact with the insured automobile, and when the accident was viewed
in a broad transactional sense, Pamela was injured in an automobile
accident. Id. at 246, 399 A.2d at 678. Finally, the court found that
the mention of a particular type of injured pedestrian in N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 39:6A4 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980), i.e., a pedestrian sustaining an injury from the automobile of the named insured, did not
preclude other types of pedestrians from PIP coverage. 166 N.J.
Super. at 246, 399 A.2d at 678. The court noted that if the legislature
intended to limit the type of pedestrian covered by the PIP provisions, they would have clearly done so. Id. at 246-47, 399 A.2d at
678.
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Prior to the court's decision, the question of what circumstances
fall within the scope of PIP provisions had been dealt with in several
cases. In Hoglin v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 144 N.J.
Super. 475, 366 A.2d 345 (App. Div. 1976), the court allowed recovery to a plaintiff injured when his motorcycle struck an automobile.
Similarly, in Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Tolhurst, 146
N.J. Super. 285, 369 A.2d 946 (App. Div. 1977), a plaintiff was allowed recovery for bums caused by the explosion of gasoline leaking
from his car. Id. at 287, 369 A.2d at 947. A bicyclist injured by a
stick thrown from a car was allowed recovery in Westchester Fire
Insurance Co. v. Continental Insurance Co., 126 N.J. Super. 29, 312
A.2d 664 (App. Div. 1973), aff'd, 65 N.J. 152, 319 A.2d 732 (1974).
In Westchester, the court set down the standard that "there need
only be shown a substantial nexus between the injury and the use of
the vehicle." Id. at 38, 312 A.2d at 669. In view of these authorities,
the Berg court concluded that it " 'makes no difference if the injured
person was, at the time of the accident, riding in a car or on a bicycle, motorcycle, truck, snowmobile, horse, donkey or bus,' so long as
he comes in contact with an insured automobile." 166 N.J. Super. at
247, 399 A.2d at 678-79.
Basically, the Berg court has chosen the broadest possible interpretation for the language of the statute, and correctly noted that
tort concepts are not pertinent to the no-fault statute's interpretation.
Id. at 243-44, 399 A.2d at 678. The criterion for recovery, based
upon the goal of the no-fault law, is that an automobile must be involved in the accident which resulted in bodily injury. Id. at 244, 399
A.2d at 678. Thus, Berg reinforces the position of the New Jersey
courts that public policy mandates recovery where any provision of
the statute can be construed to include the situation of the plaintiff in
question.
B.L.R.
AUTOMOBILE

INSURANCE-INSURED'S

REGULAR

USE

OF

AUTOMOBILE

PRECLUDES COVERAGE FOR His CHILD UNDER

NON-OWNED

AUTOMOBILE COVERAGE PRovISION-DiOrio v.

New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Co., 79 N.J. 257, 398 A.2d
1274 (1979).
On May 1, 1968, Jon Palmer, an infant, was severely injured
while a passenger in an automobile driven by Gennaro DiOrio. The
automobile was owned and insured by the service station business in
which Generoso DiOrio, the father of Gennaro, was one of two gen-
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eral partners. The car involved had originally belonged to Generoso
DiOrio and had been insured by him under his New Jersey
Manufacturers' family policy until 1966, when he transferred title to
the partnership. Generoso continued to use the car for transportation
to and from work, except when it was borrowed by service station
customers. Gennaro used the car in the evenings several times a
week with the permission of his father.
Suit was brought on behalf of Jon against Generoso and Gennaro
DiOrio, and against the service station. Reliance Insurance Company,
liability carrier for the service station, offered the Palmers its full policy limit of $50,000. This being inadequate, excess coverage was
sought from New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance Company (NJM) as
the insurer of the DiOrio family's automobile. NJM disclaimed liability, claiming that the policy covered only those damages involving an
owned automobile, or a "non-owned automobile," i.e., " 'an automobile . . .not owned by or furnished for the regular use of either
the named insured or any relative ......
79 N.J. at 263, 398 A.2d at
1277.
The trial court found that the automobile had been furnished for
the regular use of the named insured's son, Gennaro and ruled for
NJM. The appellate division affirmed. The supreme court, in a divided decision, reversed the judgment, 63 N.J. 597, 311 A.2d 378
(1973) (DiOrio I), holding as error the ruling that the automobile was
furnished for the regular use of Gennaro. The case was remanded to
determine whether the automobile was furnished for the regular use
of the father, Generoso, and whether excess coverage was denied to
all insureds if the vehicle was furnished for the regular use of any
insured. Upon remand, the trial court found that the automobile was
furnished for the regular use of the father and that the NJM policy
limitations excluded coverage for the son. The appellate division affirmed for the reasons expressed in the opinion of the trial court.
Certification was granted to review this determination. 75 N.J. 540,
384 A.2d 519 (1977).
In DiOrio 1, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused, on the
basis of the record before them, to decide the issue of whether "regular use" of a non-owned automobile by any member of a family precluded coverage for occasional use by all other members of the family. However, the clear implications in DiOrio I were that such
coverage would not be precluded since the provisions of the policy
were ambiguous. 63 N.J. at 606, 311 A.2d at 383. The court specifically noted the ambiguity by pointing out that the named insured
himself would never be covered, even on an isolated occasion, while
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driving a car owned by a relative living with him. Id. They found that
this could not be the policy intent and that it would be extraordinary
to expect Generoso DiOrio to take out a second policy to cover his
son's use of the automobile owned by the partnership. Id. at 607, 311
A.2d at 384.
Justice Mountain, joined by Justice Proctor, strongly dissented in
DiOrio I. 63 N.J. at 609, 311 A.2d at 385 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
In his opinion, Justice Mountain pointed out that the case before
them could have been decided without a remand by simply following
the earlier New Jersey supreme court decision in Rider v. Lynch, 42
N.J. 465, 201 A.2d 561 (1964). In an analogous fact situation, the
Rider court had held that where an automobile was furnished for the
regular use of Tomiko Lynch by a third party, it did not qualify for
coverage under a "non-owned automobile" clause, and, therefore, her
father did not have coverage for an accident which occurred while he
was driving the car. Id. at 474, 201 A.2d at 566. Furthermore, Justice
Mountain believed that the purpose of the exclusion, to prevent an
insured from obtaining coverage for some or all cars regularly used or
owned by the insured by merely listing only one automobile on the
family policy, was both reasonable and wholly legitimate. 63 N.J. at
613-14, 311 A.2d at 387-88 (Mountain, J., dissenting).
In the instant case (hereinafter referred to as DiOrio II) the supreme court has reversed itself and adopted the position taken by the
dissent of Justices Mountain and Proctor in DiOrio I. The DiOrio II
decision took specific note of the fact that NJM, and other insurers,
offered a specific " 'extended non-owned automobile coverage' " endorsement which specifically covered incidents identical to the fact
situation of the DiOrios. 79 N.J. at 264, 398 A.2d at 1278-79. While
considering the position that the reasonable expectations of the insured are read into insurance contracts where there are genuine ambiguities, the court refused to find ambiguity in the NJM provisions.
Id. at 269-70, 398 A.2d at 1280-81. Also contributing to this decision
was the fact that the record was barren of any suggestion that the
DiOrios expected coverage from NJM in view of the removal of the
car from the NJM policy. Id. at 270, 398 A.2d at 1280-81.
Justice Pashman alone dissented in DiOrio II, saying that coverage was within the reasonable expectations of the DiOrios and that
"the strong and explicit language" of DiOrio I should not be ignored.
Id. at 273-74, 398 A.2d at 1282 (Pashman, J., dissenting). He stated
that the confusing language of the policy necessitated a construction
favoring the insured. Id. at 272-73, 398 A.2d at 1281-82.
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DiOrio II thus clearly mandates the position which the New Jersey courts will take with respect to non-owned automobile coverage.
The decision should be taken as a strong recommendation for every
family to obtain the available, additional endorsement, where there is
a non-owned automobile in the family which may, on occasion, be
utilized by another family member. Additionally, if the position of
Justice Pashman's dissent should find favor in the legislature, there is
a substantial possibility that such coverage in standard family policies
may be provided by an amendment to the no-fault law itself.
B.L.R.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATUTORY SCHEME WHICH DELEGATES
TO RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATION THE POWER To MAKE AND ENFORCE
LAWS THROUGH ESTABLISHMENT OF MUNICIPAL COURT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL,

State v. Celmer, 80 N.J. 405, 404 A.2d 1 (1979).

In March, 1976, defendant Louis Celmer, Jr. was arrested by
officers of the Ocean Grove Police Department and charged with
speeding, driving while under the influence of alcohol, and disregard
of a traffic signal. The trial court found him guilty, but upon appeal to
the Monmouth County Court he was acquitted on the strength of his
argument that the Ocean Grove Municipal Court was an "improperly
constituted tribunal." 80 N.J. 409, 404 A.2d at 3. Two years later, the
appellate division reversed the county court's decision as to the constitutionality of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:97-1 to 97-9 (West 1973 &
Cum. ,Supp. 1979-1980). The New Jersey supreme court then reversed the appellate division, reiterating, in the process, the earliest
justifications offered for the "establishment of religion clause" of the
first amendment. The court's decision ostensibly rested upon the notion, espoused by Thomas Jefferson, that the first amendment sought
to erect a " 'wall of separation between Church and State.' " 80 N.J.
at 414, 404 A.2d at 5.
The constitutional implications in Celmer centered around the
formation of the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the
United Methodist Church (Association) and the legislative grants of
power extended to it in the form of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:97-1 to
97-9 (West 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). In 1869, Rev. William
Osborn and a small congregation of Methodist followers founded a
settlement on the 260 acre camp meeting ground which today forms
the center of Ocean Grove. The community of worshippers
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flourished, and in 1870 the Association was incorporated by state
charter. The Association was organized for the express purpose of
"'provid[ing] and maintain[ing] . . . a proper, convenient and
desirable permanent camp meeting ground and Christian seaside resort' " for the congregation. 80 N.J. at 411, 404 A.2d at 3.
As a means of insuring the achievement of this goal, title to all
land located within Ocean Grove was retained by the Association. In
addition, the subdivision of property was accomplished through renewable leases of ninety-nine years duration to persons "who may be
vouched for as of good moral character and in sympathy with the
objects of [the] Association." Id. at 411, 404 A.2d at 3-4. The by-laws
further provided that the Association's president was to be empowered to approve all transfers of land within the enclave. The
Association's various police powers derived from N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40:97-1 to 97-9 (West 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1979-1980), which
granted to Ocean Grove's Board of Trustees "exclusive jurisdiction" to
"maintain and preserve order" within Ocean Grove and the power to
"make and enforce rules and regulations to promote and protect the
public health." In addition, they were given the power to "prescribe
penalties" and to enforce them by establishing a municipal court. 80
N.J. at 412, 404 A.2d at 4.
In striking down the statutory scheme as unconstitutional, the
court utilized the language of Justice Black, who noted that
" '[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or
groups and vice versa.' " The court further noted, in pertinent part,
that "there can be no question but that at a minimum [the First
Amendment] precludes a state from ceding governmental powers to a
religious organization." Id. at 415-16, 404 A.2d at 6.
To the extent that it is inconsistent with the holding in Celmer,
the New Jersey supreme court has specifically overruled its earlier
decision in Schaad v. Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, 72
N.J. 237, 370 A.2d 449 (1977). In Schaad the court interpreted the
primary effect of the statutes to be the creation of a "mechanism for
basic local regulation of the camp meeting community." Id. at 258,
370 A.2d at 460. The immediate effect of the ruling in Celmer is that
the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association of the United Methodist
Church can no longer exercise the power to enforce rules, promulgated by the Association's Board of Trustees, through the establishment of a police force and municipal court. The governing body of
Neptune Township must henceforth exercise these governmental
functions.
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In light of the departure from previous rulings in New Jersey
concerning the constitutionality of N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:97-1 to 97-9
(West 1973 & Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) it remains to be seen what
long term effects this decision will have for those who have grown
accustomed to the lifestyle which has existed in Ocean Grove for so
many years. As Justice Pashman noted in his opinion, the Association
remains free to voluntarily abide by those rules, "which it deems
necessary to protect Ocean Grove's unique cultural and spiritual
characteristics," id. at 420, 404 A.2d at 8. Yet voluntary adherence to
these rules could result in the abandonment of a way of life which has
survived undisturbed for over a century.
T.J.P.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-PROSECUTOR'S CONSENT To ADMIT
DEFENDANT INTO PRETRIAL INTERVENTION

PROGRAM CANNOT

BE NULLIFIED BY JUDICIARY UNLESS ABUSE

PRESENT-State

OF DISCRETION

v. Hermann, 80 N.J. 122, 402 A.2d 236 (1979).

In April, 1977, a student at Hunterdon Central High sold to
Robert Hermann, a teacher, lumber which he had stolen from a
construction site. Frederick Jones, another teacher, had deliberately
referred the student to Hermann in order to facilitate the consummation of the sale. In June, 1977, Hermann was indicted for the
knowing receipt and possession of stolen property valued in excess of
$200, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:139-1 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980),
and Jones was charged with willfully aiding and abetting the commission of the crime. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:85-14 (West Cum. Supp.
1979-1980).
In June of 1977, both defendants applied for admission to the
Hunterdon County pretrial intervention program (PTI), which diverts
from the traditional criminal process persons with high rehabilitative
prospects. The prosecutor consented to the enrollment of both
defendants in PTI, despite contrary views from both Raritan Township's Director of Public Safety and Hunterdon's Board of Education.
These parties believed that PTI diversion would " 'leave the impression with young people that breaking the law is an acceptable practice' as well as 'negate [defendants]' effect as disciplinarians' within
the school system." 80 N.J. at 125, 402 A.2d at 238.
The trial judge rejected both applications for admission, even
though he said they were not arbitrary or capricious. In his view, the
court was entitled to exercise "judicial discretion" when reviewing a
prosecutorial decision approving PTI admission. He believed that the
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defendants should stand trial and " 'be subjected not only to the rehabilitation portion of the sentencing process (of which PTI may be
considered . . . a substitute) but also to the punitive and deterrent
aspects thereof.' " Id. at 126, 402 A.2d at 238. The defendants appealed, and the appellate division affirmed the trial court's decision,
concluding that the "gross and patent abuse of discretion" standard of
review enunciated in State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 375 A.2d 607
(1977) (Leonardis II), was applicable only in cases where a prosecutor
rejects the admission of a defendant into a PTI program. Where the
prosecutor has consented, the appellate court stated that the court
could be more critical and overturn the prosecution's decision if "PTI
diversion would be contrary to the 'interests of justice.' " 80 N.J. at
126, 402 A.2d at 238.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed, and held that "in
order for a trial court to overturn a prosecutorial decision admitting
an applicant to PTI, it must clearly be convinced that the prosecutor's
determination constitutes a patent and gross abuse of his discretion."
Id. at 128, 402 A.2d at 239. The court believed that great deference
must be accorded the prosecutor's decision in PTI matters for two
reasons. First, the judicial interference with prosecutorial decisions
has traditionally been limited to situations where the prosecutor's
conduct was "arbitrary.' Second, the court emphasized that one of
the main purposes for adopting New Jersey Rule 3:28, which provided for pretrial intervention programs, was to provide prosecutors
with alternatives to theretofore available criminal processes. Id. at
127, 402 A.2d at 238-39.
Prior to the instant case, the New Jersey courts had not addressed the issue concerning the standards to be utilized by trial
judges in reviewing prosecutorial decisions approving admission into
a PTI program. In Leonardis II, however, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey held that trial courts had the power to order a defendant to be
admitted into a PTI program over the refusal of the prosecutor if the
defendant could "clearly and convincingly" demonstrate that the
prosecutor's veto constituted a "patent and gross abuse of his discretion." 73 N.J. at 382, 375 A.2d at 618.
Although Leonardis II involved judicial review of a prosecutorial
refusal to divert, the supreme court believed that the tests utilized by
the Leonardis court were "equally applicable in contexts in which
[the prosecutor] consents to PTI enrollment." 80 N.J. at 127, 402
A.2d at 239. The prosecutor should have broad discretionary powers
in managing the responsibilities of his office, and this discretion must
include both the decision to prosecute an individual and to refrain
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from prosecuting an offender. In order for the judiciary to nullify the
prosecutor's consent to enroll a defendant in a PTI program, the
court concluded that it must be illustrated that the prosecutor's determination constituted a patent and gross abuse of his discretion. Id.
This decision clearly extends the ruling in Leonardis H and affirms the court's deferential approach to prosecutorial decisions concerning enrollment of defendants in PTI programs. The result is that
a prosecutor's consent to admit a defendant into a PTI program is
almost guaranteed to survive judicial review, increasing the number
of persons participating in such programs. By allowing prosecutors to
have almost a 'free hand' in this area, the court hopes that rehabilitation of offenders will become more effective and that the disposition
of criminal matters will be facilitated.
J.E.T.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-REFUSAL TO

SANCTION DEFENDANT'S

ADMISSION INTO PRETRIAL INTERVENTION PROGRAM CANNOT
RESULT FROM PROSECUTOR'S ABUSE OF DISCRETION-State

v.

Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 402 A.2d 217 (1979); State v. Maddocks, 80
N.J. 98, 402 A.2d 224 (1979); State v. Sutton, 80 N.J. 110, 402
A.2d 230 (1979).
On May 24, 1979, the Supreme Court of New Jersey decided
three companion cases which reviewed prosecutorial decisions denying defendants admission into county pretrial intervention programs
(PTI). Pretrial intervention programs were introduced in New Jersey
in 1970 when N.J.R. 3:28 was adopted to divert "individuals with
high rehabilitative prospects from the traditional channels of the criminal process." State v. Bender, 80 N.J. at 88, 402 A.2d at 219.
Another goal of this program was to facilitate the disposition of criminal matters to alleviate the case backlogs in the trial courts. Id. at 88,
402 A.2d at 220.
Although the three appeals do not concern identical issues, they
can be analyzed together by focusing on the tests applied by the
judiciary in determining whether the prosecutor's refusal to admit the
defendant into the diversionary program complied with PTI
Guidelines or was the result of an abuse of discretion. All three cases
were concerned with defendants who were first offenders and who
were excluded from PTI programs because of the prosecutor's nonconsent.
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In Bender, the defendant, a pharmacist, systematically diverted
cocaine from his employer's stocks over a four-year period to satisfy
his dependence on the drug. The prosecution did not consent to defendant's enrollment into the PTI program because the defendant's
course of conduct was a continuing criminal business and, since the
defendant was a licensed pharmacist, his conduct constituted a breach
of public trust. Id. at 92, 402 A.2d at 221.
The case of State v. Maddocks concerned an 18 year-old defendant who was charged with breaking and entering into a luncheonette
with intent to steal. He refused to cooperate with the law enforcement officials by identifying his accomplices. The prosecution's refusal
to admit the defendant into the PTI program was supported by its
belief that the defendant possessed an attitude not conducive to PTI
and that the defendant was on the "periphery" of other criminal investigations. 80 N.J. at 102-03, 462 A.2d at 227.
The third and final controversy, State v. Sutton, involved a defendant who failed to report any changes in her current income to the
welfare board over a four and one-half year period. The reason underlying the prosecutor's rejection was cursorily stated as: " 'New Jersey
Supreme Court Guideline § 3(i)(2) . . . part of a continuing criminal

business or enterprise.' " 80 N.J. at 116, 402 A.2d at 233.
In all three cases, the supreme court remanded for further proceedings consistent with the guidelines set forth in its opinions. The
court acknowledged that the appropriate inquiry was whether, in
each case, the prosecutor's decision constituted a " 'patent and gross
abuse of his discretion.' " 80 N.J. at 93, 101-02, 113-14 (quoting
State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 360, 382, 375 A.2d 607, 618 (1977). If so,
the court would be able to intervene in the matter and allow the
defendant to be diverted into the PTI program.
In deciding whether there was an "abuse of discretion," the
court stated that the defendant has the burden of showing that the
prosecutorial veto did not consider all relevant factors, was premised
upon irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or amounted to an obvious
error in judgment. In order for such an abuse of discretion to meet
the requirement of "patent and gross," the defendant must further
prove "that the prosecutorial error complained of will clearly subvert
the goals underlying Pretrial Intervention." Bender, 80 N.J. at 93,
402 A.2d at 222. The defendant must sustain a heavy burden in order
to overcome a prosecutorial veto because "great deference should be
given to the prosecutor's determination not to consent to diversion."
Leonardis II, 73 N.J. at 381, 375 A.2d at 617.
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The prosecutor, in determining whether to consent to a defendant's enrollment in a PTI program, must consider the defendant's
amenability to correction, his responsiveness to rehabilitation, and
the nature of the offense wih which he is charged. Further, the prosecution's decision must be in writing, must be disclosed to the defendant, and must be in accordance with PTI guidelines. Bender, 80
N.J. at 89, 402 A.2d at 220.
In applying these general rules to Bender, the supreme court
held that the defendant's stealing of cocaine over a four-year period
did not constitute a "continuing criminal business or enterprise" or a
"breach of the public trust" so as to justify the State's objection to the
defendant's enrollment in the PTI program. Id. at 95-96, 402 A.2d at
223. In Maddocks, the supreme court remanded to provide the defendant with an opportunity to reconsider his decision not to reveal
his accomplice's identity and to allow the prosecutor to specify in
greater detail types of criminal activities in which the defendant was
believed to be involved. 80 N.J. at 108, 402 A.2d at 230. In Sutton,
the defendant's failure to report changes in her current income to the
welfare board constituted a "continuing criminal business," PTI
Guideline 3(i)(2), because the crime " 'enrich[ed the] defendant in
some material way.' " 80 N.J. at 117, 402 A.2d at 234 (quoting
Bender, id. at 95, 402 A.2d at 223). However, the court remanded
based upon the defendant's claim that there was an abuse of discretion because the prosecutor's veto of her admission was based upon a
consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, illustrated by the
fact that he had consented in other similar cases. Id. at 119-20, 402
A.2d at 235.
Even though the supreme court articulated a deferential attitude
toward prosecutorial decisions denying defendants admission into
PTI programs, these three companion cases illustrate that the court is
taking great pains to scrutinize such prosecutorial vetos. The court is
utilizing its judicial review to assure that there is no abuse of discretion and that defendants receive a fair and just opportunity to be
diverted into PTI programs. The ramifications of these three decisions
are that a prosecutor's veto will have to be strongly justified to meet
the scrutiny of judicial review.
On the same day that these three companion cases were decided, the Supreme Court of New Jersey also decided State v. Hermann, 80 N.J. 122, 402 A.2d 236 (1979), in which a prosecutorial
consent to divert two defendants into PTI programs was rejected by
the trial judge. There, however, the supreme court reversed the trial
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court's decision. In all four cases-Bender, Maddocks, Sutton, and
Hermann-the supreme court expressed the view that deference
should be given to a prosecutor's decision as to whether a defendant
should be diverted into a PTI program. However, it was only in
Hermann that the court followed the deferential approach which it
enunciated.
The probable rationale for this ambiguity is derived from the fact
that the ultimate aim of the court is to divert as many defendants as
possible into PTI programs in order to provide them with the opportunity for rehabilitation. A secondary goal is to reduce case backlogs
in the courts. Logically, the only way to achieve these goals is for the
court to be deferential in reviewing a prosecutor's consent to divert a
defendant into a PTI program and to be critical when a prosecutor
refuses diversion.
J.E.T.

CRIMINAL

PROCEDURE-SEARCH

AND

SEIZURE-LAW

ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS MAY NOT SEARCH NON-PUBLIC AREAS
OF LICENSED TAVERN FOR EVIDENCE OF GENERAL CRIMINALITY,

UNRELATED

TO OPERATION OF THE LICENSED ACTiVITY,

State v. Williams, 168 N.J. Super.
359, 403 A.2d 31 (App. Div. 1979).
WITHOUT A SEARCH WARRANT,

Appellant Cary Williams was found guilty on November 3, 1977
of possession of lottery paraphernalia, working for a lottery, and possession of revolvers without a permit. He appealed, alleging violation
of his rights under the search and seizure provision of the fourth
amendment to the United States Constitution. 168 N.J. Super. at
360, 403 A.2d at 32. In January, 1976, two detectives of the Paterson
Police Department entered a tavern, without a warrant, to investigate
a "tip" from an unidentified source concerning a stolen CB radio.
They identified themselves as local police officers and one proceeded
to open a trap door which was located behind the bar and led to the
basement. Upon entering the basement the officer observed the defendant, Williams, and two others inside a storage room along with
several stacks of money, tally sheets, a strongbox, two hand guns and
a stolen CB radio. Id. at 361, 403 A.2d at 32.
It was the State's contention that the warrantless search was authorized by the statutes regulating the sale of alcoholic beverages,
specifically N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-35 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp.
1979-1980), and by the holding in State v. Zurawski, 89 N.J. Super.
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488, 215 A.2d 564 (App. Div. 1965), aff'd, 47 N.J. 160, 219 A.2d 614
(1966). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-35 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 19791980) provides in pertinent part: "Investigations, inspections, and
searches of licensed premises may be made without search warrant by
the director, his deputies, inspectors or investigators, by each other
issuing authority and by any officer."
In Zurawski, the court authorized a warrantless search of
licensed premises by local police who were engaged in a specific investigation as part of their enforcement duties under the alcoholic
beverage control laws. The appellate division distinguished this case
from Williams, however, by noting that the warrantless search was
directed towards uncovering evidence of general criminality and was
not conducted in furtherance of an investigation on behalf of the
Division of Alcoholic Beverage Control.
The holding in Williams is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United
States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), which concluded that the government has
"broad authority to [formulate] standards of reasonableness for
searches and seizures." Id. at 77. The significance of Williams, however, is that it restricts the right to search without a warrant under
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-35 (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979-1980) to
"legitimate regulatory inspections specifically related to enforcement
of the liquor laws and regulations under Title 33," 168 N.J. Super. at
366, 403 A.2d at 35, thus providing a workable balance between the
rights of the individual under the fourth amendment and society's
need to regulate the liquor industry. The court was careful not to
allow the sensitive nature of industry regulation to overshadow the
need to protect a tavern owner's fundamental right to be free from an
unlawful search and seizure as guaranteed by the fourth amendment.
T.J.P.
EVIDENCE -WITNESSES

-

PROSECUTOR'S

SUMMATION

SUGGEST-

ING ADVERSE INFERENCE FROM FAILURE OF DEFENDANT'S
SPOUSE TO TESTIFY IN SUPPORT OF ALIBI NOT VIOLATION OF
DEFENDANT'S

MARITAL PRIVILEGE-State

v.

Walker, 80 N.J.

187, 403 A.2d 1 (1979).
On October 18, 1977, a woman was abducted after parking her
car near her apartment in Elizabeth. She was ordered to drive to a
housing project in Newark where she was forced into the back seat of
the car and sexually assaulted. Defendant Nathaniel Walker then instructed her to drive back to Elizabeth, where he got out of the car a
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block from her apartment after the two and one-half hour ordeal. 80
N.J. at 190, 403 A.2d at 2.
The defendant was identified by the victim four months later in a
police lineup and also at the trial. Further, at trial, Walker testified
that at the time of the crime he was home with his wife. No other
witness was presented on behalf of the defense to support his claim.
In his summation, the prosecutor commented upon the failure of the
defendant's wife to give testimony corroborating her husband's alibi.
Defense counsel objected and the trial judge ruled it was proper
under the circumstances for the state to comment on it. Id. at 191,
403 A.2d at 3. The jury found the defendant guilty of kidnapping,
rape, and sodomy and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus fortythree to fifty years. Id'
The appellate division reversed the defendant's conviction on the
ground that he had a privilege of exempting his wife from testimony
under N.J.R. EVID. 23(2), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17 (1976). The
court further ruled that the prosecutor's comments on the failure of
producing the wife as a witness constituted prejudicial error under
N.J.R. EVID. 39, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84-31 (1976), and required a
reversal of defendant's conviction and a new trial. 80 N.J. at 189-90,
403 A.2d at 2.
The supreme court reversed the appellate division, finding that
the defendant had waived the marital privilege under N.J.R. EVID.
37, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84-29 (1976), by disclosing the privileged
matter, consisting of the substance of the wife's testimony, by making
her a crucial witness and referring to her presence in the courtroom
as implying she supported his alibi. The court determined this waiver
was sufficient to open the door to prosecutorial comment on the absence of his wife as a witness. 80 N.J. at 193, 403 A.2d at 4.
The decision was based on State v. Lowery, 49 N.J. 476, 231
A.2d 361 (1967), where it was held that a prosecutor may comment
adversely on defendant's failure to call his wife as a witness when
defense counsel had stated during the trial that such was his intent.
The holding of this case represents a limitation on the marital
privilege under N.J.R. EVID. 23(2), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17
(1976), which provides an absolute shield against compelled testimony
by a spouse. Defense counsel must now carefully consider any references to a spouse in court which would imply the support of an alibi
if there is no intention to call that person to the stand. The marital
privilege can no longer be used as a tactical weapon of offense to
silence the prosecutor, but instead a waiver can open the door to
prosecutorial comments implying the failure of the spouse's testimony
was due to the adversity of its content.
L.M.F.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE-

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS - INTERSPOUSAL
IMMUNITY DOCTRINE MAY NOT BE USED To DELAY ACCRUAL
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR INTENTIONAL TORTS-

Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 400 A.2d 1189 (1979).
Janina Tevis was injured as a result of a physical beating administered by her husband, Michael Tevis, on May 14, 1973. The parties
were divorced on May 22, 1975. Six weeks later, the plaintiff instituted a tort action against her ex-husband for personal injuries caused
by the beating. 79 N.J. at 424-25, 400 A.2d at 1191.
The trial court determined that N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 (West
1952), which creates a two-year statute of limitations for personal injuries, did not begin to run until the date of the divorce. The court
held that because the interspousal immunity doctrine operated as a
bar to an intentional tort suit by a wife against her husband, the
plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until that bar was lifted by
divorce. The suit was commenced within two years of the divorce.
The court, therefore, concluded that the statute of limitations would
not prevent the action, and awarded Ms. Tevis both compensatory
and punitive damages. 79 N.J. at 425, 400 A.2d at 1189.
The appellate division, while agreeing with the lower court's result, disagreed with its reasoning. The appellate court decided that
the doctrine of interspousal immunity for intentional torts was effectively abolished in Small v. Rockfeld, 66 N.J. 231, 330 A.2d 335
(1974). The court reasoned that the plaintiff's cause of action in the
Tevis case arose on the date Small was decided, namely, December
17, 1974. Consequently, the complaint was filed within the requisite
two years and the statute of limitations did not prevent recovery. 155
N.J. Super. at 278, 382 A.2d at 700. The decision of the trial court
was affirmed as to compensatory damages and reversed as to punitive
damages on other grounds. Id. at 280-81, 382 A.2d at 701.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in an opinion by Justice
Handler, reversed the decision of the appellate court. 79 N.J. at 422,
400 A.2d at 1189. The supreme court held that the two year limitation of actions began to run at the moment of injury. In its discussion, the court emphasized "the uncertainty of using the demise of
the doctrine of interspousal immunity as a tool for applying the statute of limitations." Id. at 427, 400 A.2d at 1192. As a matter of policy, this "nebulous state of the law of marital immunity" should not
be used to "permit the assertion of marital tort claims long after the
commission of the tort." Id. at 427-28, 400 A.2d at 1192-93. The
court recognized that to rule otherwise "would encourage the resurrection of old marital grievances." Id. Small was distinguished on the
ground that it was a wrongful death action which need not signify the
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abrogation of the interspousal immunity doctrine for intentional torts.
The court stated that it was not until its decision in Merenoff v.
Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978), that the immunity doctrine was definitively abolished with respect to interspousal torts.
Ironically, the court recognized that, in its earlier decision in
Merenoff, it had noted the possibility that the death knell for the
immunity in intentional suits might inhere in the decision of the appellate court in Tevis. 79 N.J. at 427, 400 A.2d at 1192. The plaintiff's cause of action accrued at the time she suffered injuries. She
failed to show equitable considerations sufficient to toll the statute.
She had an opportunity to seek damages as part of her divorce proceedings. Id. at 433-34, 400 A.2d at 1196.
Justice Sullivan concurred in the result but disagreed with the
court's reasoning. He opined that any abrogation of the immunity
doctrine would not apply retroactively. Id. Justice Pashman and Chief
Justice Hughes dissented. Justice Pashman argued that Ms. Tevis'
suit was brought within two years of the elimination of the doctrine in
Small. He criticized the majority's "mechanical" interpretation of N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-2 as "both unwarranted and unwise." Id. at 436,
400 A.2d at 1197. Chief Justice Hughes stated that he would have
affirmed for substantially the same reasons expressed in the appellate
opinion. Id. at 441, 400 A.2d at 1200.
This case lies in the midst of the transition from interspousal
immunity, with its attendant male-dominated theory of one marriageone person, to equality of legal status between the sexes. The decision marks an attempt at a solution "governed by an objective assessment of the equities, not by an understandable sympathy for
plaintiff's plight and a pardonable repugnance toward defendant's
conduct." Id. at 433, 400 A.2d at 1195.
T.C.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -ARBITRATION
INTEREST ARBITRATION

AND AWARDS-

AWARDS TO MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES

MUST BE INCLUDED WITHIN LOCAL GOVERNMENT

LIMITS-New

CAP LAW

Jersey State PBA, Local 29 v. Town of Irvington,

80 N.J. 271, 403 A.2d 473 (1979), City of Atlantic City v. Laezza,
80 N.J. 255, 403 A.2d 465 (1979).
In November, 1977, Local 29 of the New Jersey State Policemen's Benevolent Association and the Town of Irvington began
negotiations to replace their 1977 contract which was nearing expiration. When the parties were unable to resolve the dispute, they
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agreed to submit the matter to compulsory interest arbitration
pursuant to the Employer-Employee Relations Act. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 34:13A-14 to -21 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980).
Under the final offer form of arbitration which the parties
selected, the arbitrator had to decide to accept either the entire
package proposed by the employer or the entire proposal of the
employee representative. On October 9, 1978, the arbitrator issued
his opinion that the PBA's economic proposal was "more fair and
reasonable" and should be incorporated into the 1978 collective
agreement. New Jersey State PBA, 80 N.J. at 278, 403 A.2d at 476.
The following week the PBA filed a complaint in superior court seeking confirmation of the arbitral award, and the judge confirmed the
award.
The Town sought a declaratory judgment that the costs of implementing the arbitration award need not be included within the
limits imposed by the Local Government Cap Law, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40A:4-45.1 to -46 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). The Cap Law
imposes a 5% ceiling on total budgetary appropriations of a municipality over the previous year's expenditures. Excluded from this 5%
limitation are "[e]xpenditures mandated after the effective date of
[the Cap] law." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-45.3(g) (West Cum. Supp.
1979-1980). The Town contended that the costs incurred in implementing the arbitral awards need not be included within the 5% ceiling because they were mandated after the effective date of the Cap
Law and thereby encompassed within the exclusion. 80 N.J. at 279,
403 A.2d at 477.
The judge ruled that the costs of the compulsory arbitration
awards would have to be included within the Cap limits. Id. at 280,
403 A.2d at 477. An appeal was filed by the Town on January 10,
1979. While pending appeal, the case was directly certified to the
supreme court on the court's own motion.
An analogous case, City of Atlantic City v. Laezza, 80 N.J. 255,
403 A.2d 465 (1979), involved the 1978 fiscal year budget for the
municipality of Atlantic City. As adopted in April 1978, the budget
was within the limits of the Local Government Cap Law, but four
unions representing the majority of the employees of each municipal
group had not concluded contract negotiations. Each of the four disputes was submitted to arbitration pursuant to statutory provisions.
The decisions of the arbitrators were issued between May and
August 1978. City officials stated that the cost of the arbitral awards
would result in the 1978 budget exceeding the allowable figure by
$1,700,000. The City also contended that if these expenditures were
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included within the Cap limits, the residents would suffer extreme
hardship from reductions in municipal personnel and services.
Since the costs of implementing the award exceeded the Cap
limits, the municipality of Atlantic City attempted to adopt an ordinance authorizing an "emergency appropriation." N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 40A:4-46 to -52 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). Following the
statutorily prescribed procedure, the City applied to the Director of
the Division of Local Finance for approval of the ordinance. The
Director rejected the request. On October 17, 1978, the municipality
then requested a hearing before the Local Finance Board to challenge
the determination. The City, in immediate need of the money to
maintain personnel, abandoned the appeal before the Board, and on
October 23, along with the PBA, IAFF, and the Teamsters, filed suit
in superior court against the Director and the Board.
As in New Jersey State PBA, the City sought declaratory judgment that the costs incurred in implementing the awards were expenditures that should be excluded from the Cap limits. The trial
judge ruled that the costs should be excluded from the Cap Law's 5%
ceiling. City of Atlantic City, 80 N.J. at 262, 403 A.2d at 468.
Defendants filed an appeal and the supreme court certified the case
while the appeal was pending.
In New Jersey State PBA the supreme court, in an opinion
rendered by Judge Pashman, affirmed the judgment of the trial court
that costs incurred in funding compulsory interest arbitration awards
are expenditures that should be included in the municipality Cap
Law calculation. Id. at 299, 403 A.2d at 487.
The court rejected the Town's contention that the arbitration
awards constituted a new expenditure undertaken for the first time
after the effective date of the Cap Law and thereby within the purview of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:4-45.3(g) exception. The court
acknowledged that the amendment to the Employer-Employee Relations Act for compulsory arbitration to settle disputes between public
employers and the police and fire-fighting employees was passed
more than eight months after the effective'date of the Cap Law. The
court construed the exception for expenditures mandated after the
Cap Law to apply only to a new service or a new activity unreflected
in the previous year's budget. The court reasoned that the amendment merely provided a mechanism for settling disputes concerning
the level of benefits, not a new service or activity.
The extent of the Cap Law exception remains to be determined.
The opinion of the Attorney General is that N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40A:4-45.3(g) excludes only expenditures for programs required by
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newly enacted legislation. Attorney General's Formal Opinion No. 3
(1977) at 10. The only court decision which ruled on this question
held that the exception pertains to more than expenditures for programs, and this case is pending appeal. Clark v. Degnan, 163 N.J.
Super. 344, 370-74, 394 A.2d 914, 926-28 (Law Div. 1978).
The court's holding in New Jersey State PBA was a very narrow
one limited only to the inclusion of compulsory arbitration awards
within the Municipal Cap Law limits. The City of Atlantic City companion case extended the holding to include voluntary arbitration
awards. In reversing the trial court, the supreme court held that costs
incurred by a municipality in funding voluntary arbitral awards must
be taken into account when determining whether the local municipal
budget is within the fiscal limitations of the Cap Law. City of Atlantic
City, 80 N.J. at 268, 403 A.2d at 471. Applying the reasoning from
New Jersey State PBA, the court found that the arbitral awards to the
Teamsters and AFSCME did not require the municipality to engage
in a new activity or service. Since these awards resulted from voluntary arbitration, the City was under no compulsion to agree to abide
by the decisions and the costs incurred to implement the awards
were clearly not mandated law within the ambit of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 40A:4-45.3(g).
Although the issues here decided were narrow legal questions,
they are matters of major public importance. The impact of the
court's decisions in these cases will be far-reaching. The need for containing the costs of local government, while providing essential services to residents, is of great public interest. The court, however,
makes no attempt to assess whether the arbitral awards are proper in
light of the fiscal problems confronted by the cities. Justice Pashman
emphasized that the court's decision to include arbitral awards within
Municipal Cap Law limits was based solely on existing laws, regardless of the court's views as to their desirability. The fiscal constraints
thereby imposed upon local government are matters of legislative
prerogatives and the court is powerless to change the laws.
J.B.K.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS -RECOVERY
PARENTS'

EMOTIONAL

DISTRESS

IN

ALLOWED

"WRONGFUL

FOR

BIRTH"

ACTION-Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
On November 3, 1974, 38-year-old Shirley Berman gave birth to
a daughter afflicted with Down's Syndrome (mongolism). A malprac-
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tice suit, based on two causes of action, was instituted by the infant's
parents. The complaint alleged that the defendants, Drs. Allan and
Attardi, did not conform to required medical standards when they
failed to inform her of the availability of amniocentesis, a procedure
used to diagnose genetic risks. 80 N.J. at 424, 404 A.2d at 10.
According to the Bermans, as a consequence of the failure to advise
Mrs. Berman of this prenatal diagnosis, she was denied the
opportunity to undergo the procedure and the right to abort the
fetus-an option she would have elected had chromosomal defects
been detected. Id. at 425, 404 A.2d at 10.
One claim, based on "wrongful birth", was instituted to recover
monetary damages for the emotional and mental distress suffered by
the parents, and to cover necessary medical costs "to properly raise,
educate, and supervise the child." Id. at 431, 404 A.2d at 13. An
additional claim for relief brought by the infant Sharon, through her
guardian ad litem, requested compensation for "wrongful life": the
physical and emotional pain and suffering Sharon experienced and
would continue to experience as a result of the alleged negligence of
the physicians. Id. at 426, 404 A.2d at 11.
In November, 1977, the trial judge, relying on the decision
rendered in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967),
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant physicians, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to state an actionable claim for relief.
The New Jersey supreme court certified the case on its own motion
while the appeal was pending.
In Berman, the court was compelled to reevaluate its earlier
holding in Gleitman v. Cosgrove, in which the New Jersey supreme
court upheld a trial court's dismissal of a malpractice suit by a child
and its parents against two doctors for advising the mother, who contracted rubella when she was one month pregnant, that the disease
would have no effect on her child. 80 N.J. at 423, 404 A.2d at 10.
The pregnant mother relied on the assurances of the physicians and
failed to obtain an abortion. She subsequently gave birth to a child
suffering from substantial defects in hearing, speech, and physical
condition. The majority in Gleitman failed to recognize claims for relief based on "wrongful birth" or "wrongful life." See 49 N.J. at 22,
227 A.2d at 689.
Justice Pashman, speaking for the court in Berman, affirmed the
Gleitman decision regarding the lack of a valid claim for relief by the
infant, but based the conclusion on a different premise: "that Sharon
has not suffered a damage cognizable at law by being brought into
existence." 80 N.J. at 429, 404 A.2d at 12. The Berman court dis-
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agreed, in part, with the Gleitman reasoning by indicating that if the
primary concern were the ascertainment of damages, "some judicial
remedy could be fashioned." However, the more significant issue focused on the societal attitude toward life. Id. at 428, 404 A.2d at 12.
The court reasoned that, notwithstanding a physical handicap, life is
more precious than non-life. The court, though sympathetic towards
the infant's plight, and cognizant of the infant's limited abilities, denied her claim for relief because the majority refused to conclude that
the infant would have been better off if she had not been born. Id. at
430, 404 A.2d at 13.
The court reasoned differently regarding the parents' claim. In
Gleitman, the court's refusal to recognize a valid claim was attributable to two factors: the aforementioned difficulty in ascertaining damages, and public policy reasons which precluded compensation "for
the denial of the opportunity to take an embryonic life." 49 N.J. at
30, 227 A.2d at 693. The Berman court conceded that adequate compensatory damages were difficult to ascertain, but differed in its view
regarding public policy considerations. Mrs. Berman's right to undergo an abortion was viewed in light of the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in which it was
decided that a pregnant woman has a constitutional right, during the
first trimester of pregnancy, to decide whether her fetus should be
aborted. As the Berman court acknowledged in its reasoning, "[p]ublic policy now supports, rather than militates against, the proposition
that she not be impermissibly denied a meaningful opportunity to
make that decision." 80 N.J. at 432, 404 A.2d at 14.
The court precluded the parents from recovering "medical expenses to raise, educate, and supervise the child," by viewing it as a
windfall for the parents and an unfair financial burden on the physicians. Id. The court cited, with approval, contexts in which damages
were held recoverable for emotional and mental distress. In addition,
the court enunciated a measurement for damages in this case, which
were to be determined, if the allegations were proven at trial, by the
harm suffered as a result of the loss of Mrs. Berman's right to make a
choice to abort the fetus. Id. at 433, 404 A.2d at 14. The parents
were "entitled to be recompensed for the mental and emotional anguish they have suffered and will continue to suffer on account of
Sharon's condition." Id. at 434, 404 A.2d at 15.
The dramatic expansion in the ability to forecast genetic disorders mandates the communication of the presence of diagnostic procedures to the prospective parents. Although the courts are still reluctant to allow recovery based on a "wrongful life" claim, the new
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judicial willingness to recognize the liability of a physician for the
failure to advise is a significant development. The Berman court's allowance of recovery for mental and emotional anguish acts as a warning to physicians that they will not be immune from consequences
that result from their failure to inform pregnant women of available
techniques used for the determination of chromosomal defects. In
light of the United States Supreme Court ruling in Roe v. Wade, and
subsequent decisions affirming its principles, public policy considerations can no longer be asserted to preclude recovery in cases similar
to Berman.
G.L.S.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS -

PSYCHIATRY-

CAUSE OF ACTION

EXISTS AGAINST PSYCHIATRIST WHO FAILS To WARN THIRD
PARTY ABOUT POTENTIAL DANGER FROM PATIENT RECEIVING

THERAPY -McIntosh v. Milano, 168 N.J. Super. 466, 403 A.2d
500 (Law Div. 1979).
Lee Morgenstein murdered Kimberly McIntosh in July 1975.
The perpetrator had been under psychiatric treatment for two years
by the defendant, Dr. Milano. Morgenstein allegedly suffered from
drug involvement and emotional maladjustment. During the course of
his treatment, he had discussed his feelings about Ms. McIntosh with
Dr. Milano. Morgenstein indicated anxiety and hostility over his relationship with Ms. McIntosh and gave indications of violent behavior.
168 N.J. Super. at 470-73, 403 A.2d at 502-04. Decedent's administratrix instituted a wrongful death action alleging breach of duty for
failure to warn decedent, her parents or the proper authorities. The
cause of action was based upon New Jersey law and the decision in
Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334
(1976) (Tarasoff II). 168 N.J. Super. at 471, 403 A.2d at 502.
The McIntosh court recognized that a prerequisite to liability for
breach of duty arises from a violation or disregard of that duty. Id. at
480-81, 403 A.2d at 507-08. It supported the position taken in
Wytupeck v. Camden, 25 N.J. 450, 136 A.2d 887 (1957), that duty is
dependent upon the natural responsibilities of human social relationships. The court also relied upon the decision in Tarasoff II, where a
majority of the California Supreme Court believed a therapist had a
duty to warn when it had been determined that a "patient presented
a serious danger of violence to another." 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d
at 340. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965) also recognizes a special relationship between persons that imposes a duty to
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prevent harm to a third person. The Mcintosh court would impose a
duty to warn after consideration of the relationship of the parties, the
nature of the risk, and the public interest in imposing a duty. 168
N.J. Super. at 482--83, 403 A.2d at 508-09.
While recognizing the difficulty in positively predicting "dangerousness," the court believed the therapist's training and medical expertise provide the basis for determining the diagnosis and prognosis
of a patient's emotional health in the same manner as his physical
health. The court stressed that absolute accuracy is not expected but
that the therapist will be held to the standard of care and treatment
of accepted professional practices within the particular community.
This duty is analogous to a physician's responsibility to warn of contagious diseases, or the statutory requirement to warn of commission
of crimes when actual knowledge is obtained and does not encompass
vague or isolated threats. Id. at 481-86, 403 A.2d at 507-10. The
therapist-patient relationship or the more general duty of the physician to safeguard the community's welfare may provide a basis for the
duty. Id. at 489-91, 403 A.2d at 511-13,
In dismissing defendant's motion for summary judgment, the
court considered that defendant's arguments regarding standard of
care and knowledge of danger were appropriate issues for jury consideration. Id. at 489, 403 A.2d at 511. While the court recognized
the necessity of confidentiality in a therapist-patient relationship, it
considered the need to balance the patient's "limited right" of privacy
against society's interest in being protected from danger. See Hague
v. Williams, 37 N.J. 328, 336, 181 A.2d 345, 349 (1962). Referring to
the medical profession's analysis of the physician-patient privilege,
the McIntosh court pointed out that there is no ethical prohibition
against revealing confidential information to prevent immediate
danger. 168 N.J. Super. at 491, 403 A.2d at 513.
The McIntosh court's position suggests a reasonable, cautious approach taken in extending liability to an imprecise area of human behavior. The approach provides a means of considering society's interest in remedying all wrongs in an appropriate setting. By giving
society, through the jury, an opportunity to assess the reasonableness
of such conduct by imposing liability when the factual issues prove
liability is warranted, the court recognizes law and society's interrelationship.
M.V.S.
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MANUFACTURER

MUST WARN CONSUMERS OF RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH PROLONGED

USE OF

NON-PRESCRIPTION

DRUG-Torsiello v.

Whitehall Laboratories, 165 N.J. Super. 311, 398 A.2d 132 (App.
Div. 1979).
Gerald Torsiello ingested a common analgesic, Anacin, according
to the recommended dosage over a fourteen month period. This
over-the-counter drug, manufactured by Whitehall Laboratories
(Whitehall), was initially taken by Torsiello to relieve his arthritic discomfort in January 1974. A physician reassured Torsiello about his
usage of the drug. Torsiello continued ingesting the Anacin, relying
on the dosage limitation expressed on the label. Approximately fourteen months after commencing the daily dosage, Torsiello suffered an
attack of gastrointestinal hemorrhaging. 165 N.J. Super. at 135, 398
A.2d at 316-17.
A suit was instituted to recover damages sustained as a result of
the hemorrhaging. Whitehall's motion for involuntary dismissal was
granted and the case was dismissed. Id. at 318, 398 A.2d at 134. In
viewing the Anacin warning as legally adequate, the trial judge emphasized that the manufacturer's duty to warn was a limited one and
did not extend to inherent dangers in the prolonged use of an overthe-counter drug. The warning complied with required standards, according to the judge, because it stated that the consumer should consult a physician before the continuation of its use for longer than a
ten-day period. The judge further reasoned that consumers knew of
dangers associated with the extended use of an aspirin product. Id.,
398 A.2d at 135. In dismissing the suit, the judge shifted the responsibility of the harm to the plaintiff for the unreasonable use of the
drug, or to the treating physician, or to both for a combination of
their actions. Id., 398 A.2d at 135.
The appellate division rejected the lower court's reasoning and
relied on a strict interpretation of principles concerning the drug
manufacturer's duty to warn. Judge Pressler addressed two significant
issues in maintaining that the trial court erred in the dismissal of the
action: the legal adequacy of the warning, and the possible existence
of an independent intervening cause sufficient to absolve Whitehall
from liability. The court noted that a consumer's knowledge of possible harm associated with the prolonged use of an aspirin product and
the adequacy of the warning were jury questions. However, the appellate court rejected the trial judge's opinion that the instruction on
the label discharged Whitehall from its duty to warn. Id. at 327-28,
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398 A.2d at 140-41. In addition, Judge Pressler did not view the
consultation with the physician as an "unforseeable intervening force"
which acted to exculpate the drug manufacturer from liability. Id.,
398 A.2d at 141.
In its analysis, the court adopted section 402A of the
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), which sets forth criteria to
be used in the determination of a seller's liability for injuries caused
by a defective product. The court specifically addressed its attention
to Comment (j), which is concerned with the legal requirements for
directions and warnings regarding risks unknown to the consumer,
but foreseeable to the manufacturer. Id. at 319-20, 398 A.2d at 136.
The court concluded that if an aspirin product taken according to
the recommended dose is not harmful, but the manufacturer is aware
of inherent dangers, such as gastrointestinal bleeding, then "the
product is unreasonably dangerous if sold without an accompanying
warning as to that specific risk of prolonged use." Id. at 321, 398
A.2d at 137.
In its discussion the court noted the divergent legal approaches
concerning prescription and non-prescription drugs. The court emphasized that the "learned intermediary" concept, endorsed in prescription drug cases, was inapplicable in the context of over-thecounter drugs because these drugs are purchased as a means of
self-medication. In such cases, the court reasoned, the warning must
be of such a nature as to apprise the consumer of any inherent dangers known to the manufacturer but not the ultimate user. Id. at 322,
398 A.2d at 137.
The Torsiello decision indicates that New Jersey courts will impose the doctrine of strict liability on a manufacturer who fails to
adequately warn consumers of dangers associated with the prolonged
use of an over-the-counter drug. Although it raises questions regarding the interpretation of "prolonged use," and possible effects on the
advertising medium, this decision will make it possible for consumers
to be well informed prior to purchasing the product.
The effect of Torsiello, if viewed as persuasive by other courts,
will be to impose a more stringent standard on drug manufacturers
even if their drug is not dangerous if ingested on a short term basis.
Legislative enactment is needed to more clearly define the standards
enunciated by the court. If statutes more clearly reflected
contemporary standards, drug manufacturers would be afforded a
more equitable opportunity to assess their legal culpability.
G.L.S.
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PROPERTY TAXES-MOBILE HOMES HAVING CHARACTERISTICS
OF PERMANENT DWELLINGS TAXABLE AS REAL PROPERTY-

Koester v. Hunterdon County Board of Taxation, 79 N.J. 381,
399 A.2d 656 (1979).
Located in Hunterdon County, Solitude Village, is a planned
community developed in 1972 to accommodate a large number of
mobile homes varying in size and style. In many respects, these
mobile homes possessed characteristics typically associated with conventional dwellings permanently affixed to the land. The procedure
relative to the placement of a mobile home required the clearing of
land, marking lot and street locations, road construction, the installation of sewer, power, and water lines, and the establishment of a
cement foundation upon which the mobile home was installed. 79
N.J. at 384-85, 399 A.2d at 657-58.
In 1975, the homes located within Solitude Village were not included in the tax list prepared for the Hunterdon County Board of
Taxation (Board). As a result of objections to the exclusion by assessors from other municipalities within Hunterdon County, the Solitude
Village homes were placed on the tax rolls. After the mailing of individual tax bills, fifty-seven individual home owners, Solitude Village,
Inc., and the Borough of High Bridge subsequently appealed the assessments to the Board of Taxation which reaffirmed its earlier pronouncement. On appeal, the Division of Tax Appeals affirmed the
Board's judgment. Id. at 386-87, 399 A.2d at 658-59. The appellate
division affirmed the Division of Tax Appeals, differentiating between
transient type house trailers and mobile homes and noting the consistency of the decision with existing New Jersey case law. See Nelson
Cooney & Son, Inc. v. Township of South Harrison, 57 N.J. 384, 273
A.2d 33 (1971).
The Supreme Court of New Jersey in Koester v. Hunterdon
County Board of Taxation, 79 N.J. 381, 384, 399 A.2d 656, 657
(1979), affirmed the appellate division, finding that the mobile homes
of Solitude Village were taxable as real property within the meaning
of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:4-1 (West 1960 & Cum. Supp. 1979-1980),
which subjects all property, real and personal, to taxation unless expressly excluded or exempted. The Koester court expressly rejected
the contention that the placement of the mobile homes on leased
property, and the attendant privilege of removal, altered their status
as taxable property. The court held that the mobile units constituted
improvements to the land and as such were taxable as real property.
Noting the absence of controlling precedent under existing statutory
law governing mobile homes, id. at 390, 399 A.2d at 660; see N.J.
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§ 52:27D-25.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980), the court
declared that the broad statutory mandate of N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 54:4-1 (West 1960 & Cum. Supp. 1979-1980), which clearly applied
to conventional homes, extended with equal force to mobile homes
such as those found at Solitude Village. 79 N.J. at 384, 399 A.2d at
657. Such a determination was, in the opinion of the court, well
grounded in an existing national trend treating mobile homes as real
property for tax purposes. Id. at 388-90, 399 A.2d at 659-60. Additional support was derived from the manner in which the courts of
New Jersey had previously expanded the tax statutes' requirement of
real property assessment at full and fair value so as to permit the
aggregate tax to constitute a lien on the entire fee, despite separate
ownership of the land and the improvement. Id. at 392, 399 A.2d at
661; see Crewe Corp. v. Feiler, 28 N.J. 316, 146 A.2d 458 (1958);
Becker v. Little Ferry, 125 N.J.L. 141, 14 A.2d 493 (1940), aff'd, 126
N.J.L. 338, 19 A.2d 657 (Ct. Err. & App. 1941).
The Koester court's holding emphasized the inherent legislative
principles of fairness and equality. 79 N.J. at 392, 399 A.2d at 661.
Particularly supportive of the proposition was Chief Justice Weintraub's opinion in Switz v. Kingsley, 37 N.J. 566, 182 A.2d 841
(1962), wherein the court declared that "things equal to each other in
the context of local real property tax involved shall be treated
equally." Id. at 572, 182 A.2d at 844. In this light, the Koester court
recognized that the mobile homes of Solitude Village and conventional homes located within the county should be treated equally
since they received identical municipal services. To exempt the
mobile homes from bearing their share of the burden for such services, the court stated "would be incongruous." 79 N.J. at 392, 399
A.2d at 661.
The court's decision in Koester will have an impact on the
growth of mobile home communities in the State of New Jersey. An
investment which once only entailed the burden of paying a sales tax
on the purchase of the mobile home now carries all the burdens of a
conventional home. In this context, serious questions arise as to
whether mobile homeowners can continue to finance the purchase of
their homes through security agreements executed and filed under
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code. Under Koester,
mobile homeowners may be required to proceed through the same
channels as are necessary for financing a conventional home. The impact of these factors is significant and could work to substantially detract from the economic appeal which mobile homes have long enjoyed over conventional homes.
L.M.F.
STAT. ANN.
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REIMBURSEMENT REQUIRED TO

WHICH PROVIDE MEDICAID ASSISTANCE TO INTEN-

SIVE CARE PATIENTS

FACILITIES -Monmouth
403 A.2d 487 (1979).

AWAITING PLACEMENT

IN LESSER CARE

Medical Center v. State, 80 N.J. 299,

Monmouth Medical Center dispenses medical services to indigents in accordance with the New Jersey Medical Assistance and
Health Services Program (Medicaid). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-1
(West Cum. Supp. 1979-1980). In three cases, Prudential Insurance
Co., an underwriter of the state's program, denied in part, three
reimbursement claims submitted by the hospital. The claims were for
services provided to three patients. These patients were treated in
Monmouth's intensive care ward. After a time, each of the three patients could have been placed in less intensive, and less expensive,
facilities. In fact, the hospital had sought more appropriate placement, but a shortage of bed space and bureaucratic delay prevented
transfer.
The Medicaid Director agreed that reimbursement was
improper. The Director relied on a state regulation which precluded
reimbursement for services rendered while a patient awaits placement in a skilled nursing or intermediate care facility. N.J.A.C. §
10:52-1.2(a)-(18)(Note),(b)(1).
The New Jersey supreme court held this regulation to be invalid.
80 N.J. 299, 403 A.2d 487. The court concluded that the regulation
was inconsistent with the Federal Medicaid Act (Act). 42 U.S.C. §
1396 (1976). The Act's purpose, set forth in its preamble, is to provide medical aid to those unable to meet the costs of "necessary medical services." Id. The court reasoned that when patients can neither
be released nor placed in lesser care facilities, the hospital must continue to treat them. Such care is "necessary." 80 N.J. 309, 403 A.2d
492. Since the challenged regulation conflicted with the Act's purpose, the regulation was invalid under the supremacy clause of the
United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 6, § 2.
The court recognized New Jersey's interest in promoting use of
the least expensive treatment center medically feasible. However, the
regulation in question penalized those hospitals which, through no
fault of their own, were unable to find lesser care facilities for their
patients. 80 N.J. 310, 403 A.2d 492. Moreover, the state could alleviate the bed shortage problem by constructing or expanding health
institutions. Id.
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The supreme court also noted that denying recompense had a
public effect. When a hospital is not reimbursed for its services, it
must bear the costs itself. These costs are passed on to nonindigent
patients. The court opined that it was more equitable to spread the
costs of extended hospital care among taxpayers.
T.C.

